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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SEIZURES—
ACCIDENTAL SEIZURES BY DEADLY FORCE: WHO IS SEIZED DURING A 
POLICE SHOOTOUT? PLUMHOFF V. RICKARD, 134 S. CT. 2012 (2014). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
[Donald] Rickard, 44, and his live-in girlfriend, Kelly Allen, 44, died Ju-
ly 18[, 2004,] after West Memphis police chased them into Memphis and 
shot into their car. 
. . . 
Police found them dead after their car slammed into a North Memphis 
house. Either the gunshots or the crash could have killed them, the med- 
cal examiner says.  
. . . 
Even if Rickard did ram one of their cruisers when cornered . . . as West 
Memphis police contend, were officers justified in shooting, especially 
with another person in the car?
1 
This decade-old newspaper account describes an unfortunately familiar 
type of police-citizen encounter and raises a question that continues more 
than ten years later to challenge courts across the country. Between 2005 
and 2012, police officers in the United States were responsible for an aver-
age of 400 fatal shootings per year.2 In light of the need to subject police 
conduct to constitutional scrutiny,3 the judiciary plays an important role in 
probing police shootings, deterring misconduct, and incentivizing reforms 
necessary to reduce unconstitutional conduct.4 However, federal courts’ 
excessive force and seizure decisions have not yielded clear, bright-line 
mandates for law enforcement officers.5 
 
 1. Chris Conley, 2 Dead, Police Probe Asks Why, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 
25, 2004, at B1. 
 2. Kevin Johnson et al., Local Police Involved in 400 Killings Per Year, USA TODAY 
(August 15, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/police-
killings-data/14060357/. 
 3. Kathryn R. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings As Fourth Amendment Seizures, 20 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 337, 380 (1992) [hereinafter Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings]. 
 4. Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2012). Justice Robert H. Jackson explained that “the right to be 
secure against searches and seizures is one of the most difficult to protect. Since [police] 
officers are themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of court.” Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 5. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 197, 198 (1993) (“The entity primarily responsible for educating the public and the 
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Cases that arise when police officers cause injuries to bystanders and 
passengers during high-speed chases engender a unique breed of claim that 
lives somewhere on the hazy frontier between the constitutional prohibition 
of unreasonable seizure and the guarantee of substantive due process.6 The 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that police officers’ use of 
deadly force to apprehend a criminal suspect triggers the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment,7 but accidental applications of police force do not fall 
neatly into this category of Fourth Amendment decisions.8 The Civil Rights 
Act of 1871—codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983—and its state corollaries pro-
vide means of redress for the deprivation of constitutional rights,9 and most 
section 1983 lawsuits are excessive-force claims brought against state and 
local government officials.10 But whether an innocent person injured or 
killed by police force can recover on a Fourth Amendment claim brought 
under section 198311 is a closer question that often turns on where the inci-
dent took place.12 Indeed, the Supreme Court recently recognized that 
“[t]here seems to be some disagreement among lower courts as to whether 
[a vehicle] passenger . . . can recover under a Fourth Amendment theory” 
for claims of excessive force.13 Underlying the circuit split over such claims 
 
police about the Fourth Amendment—the United States Supreme Court—has often tried, 
without much success, to alleviate society’s confusion about the amendment.”). 
 6. Andrew J. Mathern, Note, Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits and Civil Gideon: A Solu-
tion to Disproportionate Police Force?, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 353, 361 (2012) (“The 
Supreme Court most commonly analyzes excessive force under either the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures or the substantive due process component of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). See also Mary Helen Wimberly, Note, Rethinking 
the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy: Grounding Privacy in the Fourth Amendment, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 283, 288–89 (2007) (discussing the first Supreme Court decision analyzing 
the Fourth Amendment, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), in which the Court 
found that the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment “run almost into each other”). 
 7. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly 
force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 8. See discussion infra Parts II.A–C. 
 9. See Michael Mosley et al., Sixteen Years of Litigation Under the Arkansas Civil 
Rights Act: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 173 (2010). 
 10. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 8–9, at 600 (6th ed. 2012). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 12. Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth 
Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1137–39 (2012) (noting that federal constitutional 
rights “can and do often vary based on geographic location, and a chief source of this varia-
tion stems from . . . the nation’s federal circuit courts of appeals”). The principal case of this 
note illustrates this issue: when a pursuit that began in Arkansas (within the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals) crossed into Tennessee (within the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals), the 
parties left a federal circuit that does not recognize “accidental seizures” for a federal circuit 
that does. See discussion infra Parts II.D–E. 
 13. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). 
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is an even more fundamental divide on which of the Supreme Court’s defi-
nitions of a Fourth Amendment seizure applies in any given case.14 
A police chase that originated in West Memphis, Arkansas, and ended 
with gunfire in Memphis, Tennessee—leaving both the driver, Donald Rick-
ard, and his passenger, Kelly Allen, dead—highlighted the current circuit 
split over whether the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment protects victims 
of “accidental seizures.”15 Given the importance of “‘develop[ing] constitu-
tional precedent’ in an area” of law that governs police officers16 and ensur-
ing constitutional safeguards for citizens who are “accidentally struck and 
tragically killed,”17 this inquiry is ripe for consideration.18 Based on the Su-
preme Court’s existing seizure definitions, excessive-force decisions, and 
treatment of negligence within the constitutional realm,19 the Court’s prece-
dent establishes that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasona-
ble seizures does not extend to accidental victims of deadly force used by 
police. Such protection may arise, however, from other sources of substan-
tive rights. 
This note explores the historical development of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of seizure and use-of-force cases, examining federal circuit court 
decisions involving seizure and excessive force claims brought by “acci-
dental seizure” victims to highlight the current disagreement among federal 
courts.20 Next, this note argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions involving 
seizure by force, claims of negligence, and substantive due process do not 
support Fourth Amendment claims arising from “accidental seizures,” which 
must then be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment.21 This note ana-
lyzes the facts underlying Plumhoff v. Rickard22 and answers in the negative 
 
 14. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 15. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022 n.4. 
 16. Id. at 2020 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). 
 17. Tina Sfondeles, Bettie Jones Was the ‘Glue’ of Her Family, Mourners Say at Visita-
tion, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), http://chicago.suntimes.com/news/bettie-jones-was-
the-glue-of-her-family-mourners-say-at-visitation (quoting a police statement issued after the 
shooting death of Bettie Jones, who was accidentally killed at her Chicago home when a 
police officer shot and killed her teenage neighbor, who became combative when the officer 
arrived). 
 18. Claims of excessive force are among the most common civil rights claims and repre-
sent a significant portion of federal courts’ section 1983 docket. See Diana Hassel, Excessive 
Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 121 (2009). Although analyzing seizures has given rise 
to a number of disagreements among the federal circuits, see Logan, supra note 12, at 1137, 
the Supreme Court is unable to address even half of those circuit splits identified by litigants 
because the Court hears so few cases. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1449 (2009). 
 19. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
 20. See discussion infra Parts II.A–C. 
 21. See discussion infra Part III. 
 22. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
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whether someone in Kelly Allen’s position23 can recover on a Fourth 
Amendment claim under existing Supreme Court precedent.24 
II. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S ANALYSIS OF SEIZURES AND CLAIMS OF 
EXCESSIVE FORCE 
Courts have interpreted both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
as prohibiting the use of excessive force by police officers.25 While both 
amendments protect the fundamental right to personal security,26 the Su-
preme Court has expressly rejected the notion that all excessive force claims 
brought under section 1983 are governed by “a single generic standard.”27 
Nonetheless, excessive police force may violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of unreasonable seizures and the substantive due process com-
ponent of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits egregious conduct.28 
Thus, determining the constitutionality of police officers’ use of force poten-
tially requires courts to analyze both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, but determining the definition of a seizure is a threshold matter that 
must be addressed before the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard 
can be applied.29 Accordingly, examining the Supreme Court’s definitions of 
a seizure is critical to understanding claims that arise in a muddled area of 
an already confusing constitutional doctrine. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Definition of Seizure 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
. . . .”30 No denial of constitutional protection “is so effective in cowing a 
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every 
 
 23. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). 
 24. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 25. Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 209–10 (1991) [hereinafter Urbonya, 
Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits]. 
 26. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Officials’ Use of Physical Force as a Fourth Amend-
ment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm Between the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 
(1979) (analyzing “an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
 27. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989). 
 28. Urbonya, Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits, supra note 25, at 207–09. 
 29. Id. at 209. See also Graham, 490 U.S. at 386. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The touchstone of analysis under the Fourth Amendment “is 
always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of 
a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (cita-
tion omitted); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001). 
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heart” as the deprivation of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.31 The 
liberty secured by the Fourth Amendment is a freedom “made in America,” 
one rooted in the colonists’ revolt against the heavy-handed law enforce-
ment methods of the British.32 The protections of the Fourth Amendment 
“apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employe[e]s of 
the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”33 
Historically, a seizure required a police officer to either physically re-
strain or arrest a person to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of 
unreasonable seizures.34 The American colonists sought safeguards “against 
the arbitrary exercise of government power . . . [and] intentional misconduct 
by government officials,”35 and the Fourth Amendment’s coupling of the 
words “persons and things to be seized” evidenced the Framers’ intent to 
prohibit arbitrary arrests.36 However, the Fourth Amendment as ratified in 
1791 “had both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.”37 
More than 200 years after its ratification, the Fourth Amendment con-
tinues to precipitate novel constitutional questions and innovative variations 
on the familiar themes of search and seizure.38 Determining with consistency 
when government actors have effected a seizure of an individual within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has been a difficult task for the Supreme 
Court of the United States.39 As Professor La Fave has noted, the Court for 
many years did not provide a workable definition of what government con-
duct amounted to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.40 
Thus, a fundamental problem with analyzing Fourth Amendment law is 
that it is convoluted and does little to inform the lower courts and the very 
officials whom the amendment was ratified to govern.41 In the context of 
seizure by deadly force, an additional problem arises in distinguishing torts 
actionable under state law from constitutional violations, which may be 
 
 31. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 32. Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1997). 
 33. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 34. Pamela A. Lemoins, Comment, Brendlin v. California: Riding Shotgun with the 
Fourth Amendment, 35 S.U. L. REV. 573, 581 (2008). 
 35. Ronald J. Bacigal, In Pursuit of the Elusive Fourth Amendment: The Police Chase 
Cases, 58 TENN. L. REV. 73, 93 (1990) [hereinafter Bacigal, In Pursuit]. 
 36. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42, 45 (1966). 
 37. Id. at 44–45. 
 38. Bacigal, In Pursuit, supra note 35, at 73. 
 39. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 342; Lemoins, supra note 34, at 
581 (“Historically, the Supreme Court struggled to perfect a test to determine when a police-
citizen encounter rose to the level of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 40. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.1(a) (5th ed. 2012). 
 41. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1472 (1985). 
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remedied under section 1983.42 The confusion is compounded by an under-
lying circuit split over which of the Supreme Court’s many definitions of a 
seizure applies in any given case.43 
1. The “Reasonable Person” Test for Seizures 
Terry v. Ohio44 has been described as “the big bang that starts the mod-
ern world of variable levels of seizures of the person.”45 In an opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Warren, the majority in Terry rejected the notion that 
the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable if an officer stops short of something 
called a “technical arrest.”46 The Court held “that whenever a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ 
that person.”47 
Terry thus extended the scope of the Fourth Amendment to include 
temporary detentions that stop short of full custodial arrests.48 The Supreme 
Court subsequently recognized a wide range of potential police-citizen en-
counters that implicate the Fourth Amendment’s protections.49 Determining 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment after Terry has proved difficult, howev-
er, as the Supreme Court’s seizure analysis “evolved into this puzzling 
patchwork of three tests that are sometimes complementary and sometimes 
inconsistent.”50 
Twelve years after Terry, a faction of the Court in United States v. 
Mendenhall51 recognized that a person is seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”52 Justice Stewart, writing only for himself and then-Justice 
Rehnquist, echoed the Terry definition of a seizure before announcing the 
“reasonable person” test to determine when an officer restrains a person’s 
freedom to walk away from the encounter.53 
 
 42. Mark Albert Mesler II, Note, When an Innocent Bystander Who Is Injured by A 
Police Officer Can Recover Under § 1983, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 781, 782 (1995). 
 43. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 340 (1992). 
 44. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 45. Ronald J. Bacigal, A Unified Theory for Seizures of the Person, 81 MISS. L.J. 915, 
916 (2012) [hereinafter Bacigal, A Unified Theory]. 
 46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145, 152 (1994) 
[hereinafter Bacigal, The Right of the People]. 
 49. Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment—Another 
Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 601, 608 (1992). 
 50. Bacigal, A Unified Theory, supra note 45, at 923. 
 51. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 52. Id. at 554. 
 53. Id. 
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Although Justice Stewart’s pronouncement did not garner the support 
of five justices in Mendenhall, the “reasonable person” test gradually gained 
acceptance as the standard to determine when a seizure takes place in situa-
tions short of a physical restraint.54 Addressing seizure issues related to a 
brief automobile chase, a unanimous court in Michigan v. Chesternut55 
acknowledged the Court’s acceptance of the “necessarily imprecise” test 
announced in Mendenhall, explaining that no mechanical rule applicable to 
all investigatory pursuits could be fashioned within the meaning of a sei-
zure.56 In a concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy foreshad-
owed the Supreme Court’s departure from the Mendenhall “reasonable per-
son” test that would materialize in Justice Scalia’s opinions in Brower v. 
County of Inyo57 and California v. Hodari D.,58 both decided within three 
years of Chesternut.59 
2. The Departure From the ‘Reasonable Person’ Test 
Brower marked the Court’s shift away from the “reasonable person” 
test.60 The case involved a twenty-mile high-speed chase, which ended when 
the driver of a stolen car crashed into a police roadblock and died.61 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari62 to resolve a conflict between the Ninth 
and Fifth Circuit.63 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion did not mention Mendenhall and its 
“reasonable person” formulation, but rather held that a physical seizure oc-
curs “only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of move-
ment through means intentionally applied.”64 In a separate opinion joined by 
 
 54. Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court’s Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What 
Is a “Seizure” of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 619, 626–27 (1990). See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983); INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984). 
 55. 486 U.S. 567 (1988). 
 56. Lemoins, supra note 34, at 583. 
 57. 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
 58. 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 59. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is 
at least plausible to say that whether or not the officers’ conduct communicates to a person a 
reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate Fourth 
Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect.”). 
 60. See infra notes 63–76 and accompanying text. 
 61. Brower, 489 U.S. at 594. 
 62. 487 U.S. 1217 (1988). 
 63. Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 64. Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (emphasis in original). See also Allison K. Wyman, Note, 
Seized by the Moment-But Which Moment? How a Physical Force Seizure Requires Only 
Contact with Intent to Restrain, Not Intentional Termination of Movement, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1485, 1486 (2011). 
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three other justices, Justice Stevens recognized the majority’s departure 
from the “well-established rule” from Mendenhall.65 In Brower, the Court 
established the requirements for a seizure: termination of movement and the 
intent to seize,66 and the decision established “that the reasonable percep-
tions of the Mendenhall test are not enough to trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections.”67 
What Justice Scalia began in Brower he completed two years later in 
Hodari D.: displacing Mendenhall as the exclusive test for analyzing sei-
zures.68 In Hodari D., two officers patrolling the streets of Oakland chased 
Hodari, who fled upon seeing the officers and discarded what was later dis-
covered to be crack cocaine before he was tackled and arrested by one of the 
officers.69 The Supreme Court granted certiorari70 to decide “whether, at the 
time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been ‘seized’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”71 
Justice Scalia, writing for a seven-justice majority, continued the de-
parture “from the Mendenhall ‘reasonable person’ test and held that a po-
lice-citizen encounter amounted to a seizure only if the suspect, when faced 
with a show of authority, yielded to that show of authority.”72 The majority 
explained that “[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on 
of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it 
is ultimately unsuccessful.”73 The Court distinguished show-of-authority 
seizures by the absence of physical force and defined physical seizures as 
common-law arrests, “where intentional physical force, regardless of its 
success, constitutes a seizure.”74 
Hodari D. thus clarified the relationship between the Mendenhall test 
and the seizure standards announced in both Brower and Hodari D. by dis-
missing the Mendenhall test as “a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for seizure.”75 The Court now analyzes a Fourth Amendment seizure claim 
based on whether the officer applied intentional physical force that resulted 
in contact, or, where no contact occurred, whether the suspect’s freedom of 
 
 65. Brower, 489 U.S. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 66. Wyman, supra note 64, at 1488. 
 67. Bacigal, A Unified Theory, supra note 45, at 921. 
 68. Continuing the departure from the Mendenhall standard, the Supreme Court in Flor-
ida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), developed another “reasonable person” test: whether a 
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter. Lemoins, supra note 34, at 584–85. 
 69. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622–23 (1991). 
 70. 498 U.S. 807 (1990). 
 71. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623. 
 72. Lemoins, supra note 34, at 584 (emphasis added). 
 73. Wyman, supra note 64, at 1486. 
 74. Id. at 1493 (emphasis omitted). 
 75. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (emphasis omitted). 
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movement was terminated by his submission to a show of police authority.76 
Under Hodari D., neither the “reasonable person” test of Mendenhall nor the 
intentional means test of Brower is sufficient to constitute a seizure until 
police completely eliminate the suspect’s physical ability to escape.77 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Brendlin v. Califor-
nia,78 in which all nine justices agreed that when an officer pulls over an 
automobile, “the passenger is automatically seized [under] the Fourth 
Amendment because a passenger is subject to an officer’s authority and 
cannot ignore the officer’s presence and walk away.”79 In Brendlin, Justice 
Souter cobbled a seizure definition from Florida v. Bostick,80 Brower, and 
Hodari D.,81 and cited Mendenhall as the test for when police conduct does 
not “show an unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual’s sub-
mission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive ac-
quiescence.”82 Justice Souter’s opinion for the unanimous court in Brendlin 
explained that the crux of Brower was not that the plaintiff alone was the 
target, but rather that officers detained him “through means intentionally 
applied.”83 If there was a passenger in the car, Justice Souter continued, it 
would have made sense to hold that the passenger was seized when the car 
collided with the roadblock.84 
From these cases arose a conflict among the circuits that highlights the 
“contradictory sentiments expressed in Brower and Hodari D. regarding the 
definition of a physical seizure.”85 The federal courts are split over whether 
a physical seizure requires intent and termination of movement under Brow-
er or simply intent and physical contact under Hodari D.86 Thus, courts 
tasked with analyzing police shootings face the challenge of determining 
which seizure definition applies, choosing a standard used in a factually 
similar case, or crafting an ad hoc rule based on the facts of the case.87 This 
very question—that remains unresolved among the circuits—of whether the 
 
 76. Wyman, supra note 64, at 1497. 
 77. Bacigal, A Unified Theory, supra note 45, at 922. 
 78. 551 U.S. 249 (2007). 
 79. Lemoins, supra note 34, at 573–74. 
 80. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 81. Brendlin, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
 82. Id. at 255. 
 83. Id. at 261. 
 84. Id. The Court in Brendlin rejected the State of California’s position that a seizure 
requires a purposeful, deliberate act of detaining a passenger, noting that in Lewis the Court 
“did not even consider, let alone emphasize, the possibility that the officer had meant to de-
tain the driver only and not the passenger.” Id. 
 85. Wyman, supra note 64, at 1492. 
 86. Id. at 1489. 
 87. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 340. 
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intentional application of force by police officers amounts to a seizure when 
the suspect continues flight was implicated by the facts of Plumhoff.88 Set-
tling the physical seizure conflict would necessarily help resolve the ques-
tion of whether a passenger in Kelly Allen’s position89 can recover under the 
Fourth Amendment.90 But whether a seizure occurs is a threshold matter, 
and the Supreme Court’s excessive force decisions instruct that relief may 
be available to victims of “accidental seizures” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Excessive Force Decisions Under Both the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
In addressing an excessive force claim brought under section 1983, a 
court’s analysis begins by “identifying the specific constitutional right alleg-
edly infringed by the challenged application of force.”91 Although Garner 
established that apprehension—i.e., seizure—by the use of deadly force is 
subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment,92 the Court’s analysis was 
simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test.93 
Only subjects of police force who can allege a “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment trigger the reasonableness test;94 other victims of law enforce-
ment excessive force are protected through the Fourteenth Amendment and 
its guarantee of substantive due process.95 Preserving constitutional protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fourth—in the con-
text of the use of deadly force suggests that such force may be egregious.96 
By recognizing substantive due process as a basis for infringements of 
the right to life and personal security, the Supreme Court has clarified that 
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are possible bases for constitu-
 
 88. See Wyman, supra note 64, at 1485. 
 89. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). 
 90. See Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 341 (arguing that the Su-
preme Court’s different approaches to defining Fourth Amendment seizures require lower 
courts to rely upon their own interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 91. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
 92. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Three justices subsequently rejected the 
notion that Garner implicitly held that all excessive force claims are to be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment rather than a substantive due process standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399–
400 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 93. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007). 
 94. Randolph Alexander Piedrahita, Note, A Conservative Court Says “Goodbye to All 
That” and Forges a New Order in the Law of Seizure-California v. Hodari D., 52 LA. L. REV. 
1321, 1322 (1992). 
 95. Renée Paradis, Note, Carpe Demonstratores: Towards A Bright-Line Rule Govern-
ing Seizure in Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 316, 
316 (2003). 
 96. See Urbonya, Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits, supra note 25, at 267. 
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tional scrutiny of officials’ conduct.97 The application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a constitutional safeguard against ex-
cessive police force emerged in the landmark case of Rochin v. California.98 
Antonio Richard Rochin’s conviction for possession of morphine was re-
versed after police officers had Rochin’s stomach forcibly pumped when he 
swallowed two capsules of the drug in front of the officers.99 Evoking Jus-
tice Cardozo, the Supreme Court in Rochin defined the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a summarized constitutional guarantee of 
respect for those personal immunities [that] . . . are ‘so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ or are 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”100 
In the Fourth Amendment context, Garner was a watershed decision, 
because the Supreme Court invalidated the common-law view that police 
officers may use deadly force if they reasonably believe it necessary to pre-
vent the escape of a person fleeing from a felony arrest.101 In Garner, the 
Court held unconstitutional a Tennessee statute that authorized police offic-
ers to use “all the necessary means” to effect an arrest of a fleeing or forci-
bly resisting suspect after a Memphis policeman shot and killed a fleeing 
teenage burglar despite being “reasonably sure” the suspect was unarmed.102 
The Garner majority emphasized that the original justifications for the 
common-law rule did not apply in the modern judicial system and that the 
trend among the states was away from the common-law rule.103 However, 
Garner was limited to circumstances where a suspect was “actually appre-
hended;” otherwise, there is no “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purpos-
es.104 
Following Garner and almost forty years after Rochin, the Supreme 
Court in Graham v. Connor105 clarified that all claims that law enforcement 
officers used excessive force in the course of a seizure should be analyzed 
 
 97. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 376. Although not before the Supreme 
Court, Justice Harlan recognized that the issues arising in Terry implicated “protections afforded 
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). 
 98. E. Bryan MacDonald, Note, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Approach to Exces-
sive Force Claims Against Police Officers, 22 PAC. L.J. 157, 159 (1990). In an earlier case, 
the Court held that confessions extorted by police officers who physically tortured three 
murder suspects violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. 
State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 280 (1936). 
 99. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952). 
 100. Id. at 169 (citation omitted). 
 101. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 5.1(d). 
 102. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1985). 
 103. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 5.1(d). 
 104. Garner, 471 U.S. at 31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 105. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
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under the Fourth Amendment.106 Prior to Graham, federal courts were un-
certain concerning the source of constitutional protection for individuals 
claiming excessive force during seizure.107 Several courts looked to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process to test the constitutional-
ity of excessive force during seizure,108 while others applied Fourth 
Amendment analysis for similar claims.109This issue persists as the circuit 
courts remain split over whether “accidental seizure” victims can recover 
under the Fourth Amendment against police officers who use deadly 
force.110 
C. The Convergence of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
In the realm of excessive force claims that hover between the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision 
came in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.111 In Plumhoff, Justice Alito’s ma-
jority opinion cited Lewis after recognizing the current circuit split over 
whether someone like Kelly Allen could bring a Fourth Amendment 
claim.112 This aside has already been viewed as affirming the relevance of 
Lewis and establishing “that even fatal injury does not constitute seizure 
[absent] the requisite intent to detain.”113 Thus, for the purposes of this note, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis merits careful examination. 
In Lewis, a teenager riding as a passenger on a motorcycle died after 
the motorcycle crashed and a pursuing police vehicle accidentally ran over 
the passenger.114 The Supreme Court granted certiorari115 “to resolve a con-
flict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law 
enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit 
case.”116 
 
 106. Mitchell W. Karsch, Note, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When Does 
Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 823 (1990). 
 107. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 (citation omitted) (“[M]any courts have seemed to assume, 
as did the courts below in this case, that there is a generic ‘right’ to be free from excessive 
force, grounded not in any particular constitutional provision but rather in ‘basic principles of 
§ 1983 jurisprudence.’”). 
 108. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 109. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7. 
 110. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 111. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 112. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). 
 113. West v. Davis, 767 F.3d 1063, 1074 (11th Cir. 2014) (Benavides, J., dissenting). 
 114. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 837 (1998). 
 115. 520 U.S. 1250 (1997). 
 116. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 839. 
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While Lewis is recognized for establishing the level of culpability nec-
essary to sustain a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,117 
the Supreme Court had occasion to analyze whether the motorcycle passen-
ger was seized when he was accidentally struck by the police officer’s car, 
which would, under Graham, determine whether the plaintiffs could sustain 
a due process claim rather than a claim under the Fourth Amendment’s rea-
sonableness standard.118 In Lewis, the Supreme Court found that the passen-
ger had not been seized.119 
Justice Souter explained that under Hodari D. “a police pursuit in at-
tempting to seize a person does not amount to a ‘seizure’ within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”120 Nor did a seizure occur absent “a governmen-
tal termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally ap-
plied” under Brower.121 Justice Souter found that the facts of Lewis were 
analogous to a hypothetical scenario discussed in Brower where no seizure 
would occur: a police car attempts to stop a suspect only by a show of au-
thority—flashing lights—and in continuing pursuit accidentally stops the 
suspect by crashing into him.122 
Thus, the motorcycle passenger in Lewis was not seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the plaintiffs’ claims were analyzed 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.123 Lewis sup-
ports the proposition that not all physical force applied by police to private 
citizens amounts to a seizure and that substantive due process remains a 
viable source of constitutional protection for “accidental seizure” victims.124 
Because excessive force claims brought by passengers who are inadvertently 
injured or killed by police gunfire invoke the Supreme Court’s somewhat 
 
 117. See Bonnie E. Bull, In Pursuit of A Remedy: A Need for Reform of Police Officer 
Liability, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1015, 1029–30 (2013). 
 118. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842. 
 119. Id. at 843. 
 120. Id. at 843–44 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)). 
 121. Id. at 844 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–597 (1989)) (empha-
sis omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (reviewing federal court decisions and explaining that, “outside the context of a 
seizure, . . . a person injured as a result of police misconduct may prosecute a substantive due 
process claim under section 1983”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 124. See Karen M. Blum & John J. Ryan, Recent Developments in the Use of Excessive Force 
by Law Enforcement, 24 TOURO L. REV. 569, 578–79 (2008); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 255, 265 (2010). Support for this position 
also appears in the Court’s earlier decisions in Hodari D. and Bostick. See Bacigal, The Right of the 
People, supra note 48, at 184 (arguing that Bostick “implies that the Hodari decision is supple 
enough to recognize that certain forms of touching are insufficient for a seizure”); Wyman, supra 
note 64, at 1499 (“Bostick is correct in recognizing that certain forms of touching do not constitute a 
seizure.”). 
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muddled seizure doctrine, the federal courts analyzing such claims have 
arrived at conflicting conclusions.125 
D. The Circuit Courts Are Divided on the Issue of Whether Passengers, 
Hostages, and Bystanders Can Bring Excessive Force Claims Under 
the Fourth Amendment 
The existing case law regarding whether unintended targets of police 
gunfire during pursuits are seized under the Fourth Amendment is far from 
settled.126 Some courts interpret Brower to require an objective intent to stop 
a particular individual, and others require an objective intent to use means 
which results in a stop, whether of a known or unknown person.127 Courts 
have also disagreed about whether a seizure requires an intent to harm or an 
intent to stop.128 Adding to the discord are the circuit courts’ differing ap-
proaches to analyzing the Fourth Amendment based on whether the claimant 
is a suspect, a hostage, or an unsuspecting passerby.129 
While most bystander cases were decided prior to Brendlin, which 
seemed to steer Fourth Amendment analysis toward “objective intent,” 
Brendlin did not abandon statements in Brower that led lower courts and 
commentators to focus to some degree on the subjective intent of the offic-
ers in analyzing Fourth Amendment claims.130 Indeed, the enduring re-
quirement from Brower—that some level of purely subjective intent to seize 
is required to trigger the protection of the Fourth Amendment—has led the 
lower courts to equate an “acquisition of control over a suspect [with] a ‘sei-
zure’ only if the officer intended to accomplish this by the means actually 
used to do so.”131 A sharp circuit split has emerged. 
1. Circuits That Permit “Accidental Seizure” Victims to Bring 
Claims Under the Fourth Amendment 
Courts that permit innocent passengers to bring Fourth Amendment 
claims against police officers who use deadly force during pursuits endorse 
the limiting language of Brower that courts cannot draw too fine a line when 
determining whether the means that terminates the freedom of movement is 
 
 125. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 126. Cooper v. Rutherford, 503 F. App’x 672, 676 (11th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 
 127. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 369. 
 128. Id. at 371. 
 129. See Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1328 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 130. Gardner v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, for Kansas City, Mo., 641 F.3d 947, 952–53 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
 131. George E. Dix, Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth Amendment Reasona-
bleness, 76 MISS. L.J. 373, 378 (2006). 
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the very means that the government intended.132 In Vaughan v. Cox,133 the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment claims134 against a police officer who shot at the driver of a 
speeding vehicle in which the passenger—also a suspect—was riding, acci-
dentally hitting and killing the passenger.135 In finding that the passenger 
was seized when he was struck by the officer’s bullet, the Eleventh Circuit 
explained that it was not necessary for the means by which a suspect is 
seized to conform exactly to the means intended by the officer.136 The court 
found that the officer fired his weapon to stop the vehicle and its occupants, 
and because the passenger was hit by a bullet that was meant to stop him, he 
was subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure.137 
Likewise, in Fisher v. City of Memphis,138 the Sixth Circuit considered 
the Fourth Amendment claim of a passenger who was struck by a bullet 
fired by a police officer who, to avoid being hit by the vehicle in which the 
passenger was riding, jumped on the hood of his own vehicle and simulta-
neously fired at the vehicle.139 The Sixth Circuit found that the car was the 
intended target of the officer’s intentionally applied exertion of force and 
that by shooting at the driver of the moving car, the officer intended to stop 
the car, effectively seizing everyone inside.140 
 
 132. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1329. 
 133. 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 134. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit, after determining the passenger was seized within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, found the Fourteenth Amendment claim lacked merit 
under Lewis rather than that the claim was covered by the Fourth Amendment under Graham. 
Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1333. 
 135. Id. at 1328. The Vaughan court recognized that a different analysis was required for 
Fourth Amendment claims brought by passengers who were suspects rather than hostages or 
innocent bystanders. Id., at 1328 n.4; Cooper v. Rutherford, 503 F. App’x 672, 675 (11th Cir. 
2012) (“However, this court just as clearly acknowledged the difference between the events 
in Vaughan and . . . when an innocent bystander or hostage is accidentally shot by police 
officers chasing a fleeing suspect.”). 
 136. Vaughan, 343 F.3d at 1329. 
 137. Id. See also Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209–11 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding a 
passenger was seized when vehicle collided with police roadblock). 
 138. 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 139. Id. at 315. 
 140. Id. at 318–19. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Fisher in Rodriguez v. Passinault, 637 
F.3d 675, 686 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Under Fisher, an officer’s intentionally applied exertion of 
force directed at a vehicle to stop it effectuates a seizure of all occupants therein.”). However, 
there is conflicting authority within the Sixth Circuit regarding the viability of a bystander’s 
Fourth Amendment claim. See Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment ‘reasonableness’ standard does not apply to section 1983 claims 
which seek remuneration for physical injuries inadvertently inflicted upon an innocent third 
party by police officers’ use of force while attempting to seize a perpetrator, because the 
authorities could not ‘seize’ any person other than one who was a deliberate object of their 
exertion of force.”). 
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Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found a seizure occurred when a thirteen-
year-old boy was accidentally bitten by a police patrol dog used by an of-
ficer to find the boy, who was reported missing.141 In Melgar ex rel. Melgar 
v. Greene,142 the court interpreted Brower to mean that “so long as the in-
strumentality is intended, a seizure occurs even if the degree of the instru-
mentality’s effectiveness was unanticipated.”143 The Fourth Circuit reasoned 
that the officer specifically used the dog to locate the boy, and found that the 
fact that the seizure did not occur in the manner envisioned by the officer 
was not outcome determinative.144 
These decisions rely on a more expansive interpretation of intent to 
seize under Brower, allowing Fourth Amendment claims notwithstanding 
the absence of intent to seize a specific person, such as passengers who are 
inadvertently struck by gunfire when police fire at vehicles.145 This approach 
is rejected by the majority of federal circuits that interpret Brower to require 
intent to seize a particular person.146 
2. Circuits That Do Not Permit “Accidental Seizure” Victims to 
Bring Claims Under the Fourth Amendment 
The majority of circuits analyzes an accidental shooting victim’s ex-
cessive force claim using the substantive due process framework.147 The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rucker v. Hardford County., 
Maryland.148 held that Brower directly foreclosed a Fourth Amendment 
claim by a plaintiff who was not the intended object of a police shooting by 
which he was injured.149 The Rucker court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that a seizure occurs if the act of restraint itself is intended—e.g., the act of 
shooting—and restrains one not intended to be restrained.150 Ten years later 
in Milstead v. Kibler,151 the Fourth Circuit again discussed two types of “ac-
cidental seizures”: when an officer shoots at a suspect but misses, accidently 
 
 141. Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2010). Like the Sixth 
Circuit, there is conflicting authority within the Fourth Circuit regarding “accidental sei-
zures.” See infra notes 148–152 and accompanying text. 
 142. 593 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 143. Id. at 354 (emphasis omitted). 
 144. Id. The Melgar decision appears to be an application of the instruction in Brower 
that it is “enough for a seizure that a person be stopped by the very instrumentality set in 
motion or put in place in order to achieve that result.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
599 (1989). 
 145. See supra notes 131–139 and accompanying text. 
 146. See discussion infra Part II.D.2. 
 147. See infra notes 147–161. 
 148. 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 149. Id. at 281. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 243 F.3d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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hitting a bystander, and when an officer shoots “at a person he believes to be 
the suspect and hits the intended target, but . . . the target was misidentified 
and turns out to be an innocent victim.”152 Relying on Brower, the Fourth 
Circuit again found that no seizure occurs in the first situation “because the 
means of the seizure were not deliberately applied to the victim.”153 
In Landol–Rivera v. Cruz Cosme,154 the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that no seizure occurred when a hostage taken during an armed 
robbery was inadvertently struck by police gunfire when the suspect began 
fleeing in a car.155 Also relying on Brower, the Landol–Rivera court found 
that a “police officer’s deliberate decision to shoot at a car containing a rob-
ber and a hostage for the purpose of stopping the robber’s flight does not 
result in the sort of willful detention of the hostage that the Fourth Amend-
ment was designed to govern.”156 
Similarly, the Second Circuit held that a hostage who was accidentally 
shot when police fired at his captor had no interest protected by the Fourth 
Amendment,157 and the Tenth Circuit rejected a hostage’s Fourth Amend-
ment claim because there was not intent to seize the hostage.158 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied similar reasoning in upholding a 
district court’s jury instruction “that negligent conduct alone absent any in-
tentional government conduct could not form the basis” of a Fourth 
Amendment claim brought under section 1983.159 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit takes a slightly different 
approach. By analyzing a defendant officer’s subjective intent, the Eighth 
Circuit requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant officer intended to seize 
the plaintiff through the means applied to the plaintiff (e.g., gunfire) to es-
tablish a Fourth Amendment claim.160 The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar 
 
 152. Id. at 163. 
 153. Id. at 163–64. 
 154. 906 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 155. Id. at 795. 
 156. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 157. Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit, citing Medeiros, explained that “if a police officer fires his gun at a fleeing 
robbery suspect and the bullet inadvertently strikes an innocent bystander, there has been no 
Fourth Amendment seizure.” Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 158. Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2000). See also 
Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding no seizure when sheriff 
shoved plaintiff to the ground because the “sheriff only intended to remove Plaintiff from his 
path to the door; he did not intend to acquire physical control over her”). 
 159. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 160. Moore v. Indehar, 514 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2008) (“As other circuits have ex-
plained, bystanders are not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when struck by an errant 
bullet in a shootout.”); Simpson v. City of Fort Smith, 389 F. App’x 568, 571 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Moore and holding no seizure occurred where plaintiff “presented no evidence that 
[he] was struck by anything other than an errant bullet”). 
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framework in Lewis v. Sacramento County although no Fourth Amendment 
claim was before the court.161 
Thus, the circuits that do not recognize Fourth Amendment claims for 
“accidental seizure” victims reject the notion that the intention requirement 
under Brower is met by the deliberateness with which a given action is tak-
en.162 Pointing to Brower, these circuits distinguish between “police action 
directed toward producing a particular result—in Fourth Amendment par-
lance, ‘an intentional acquisition of physical control’—and police action that 
simply causes a particular result.”163 In the context of the application of 
physical force during police chases, the circuits that permit Fourth Amend-
ment claims use a broader notion of intent, and apply it to vehicles rather 
than people.164 Amid this backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Plumhoff, 
but, appropriately, did not reach the question of whether Kelly Allen, as a 
passenger, could recover under the Fourth Amendment.165 
E. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Plumhoff 
The events giving rise to Plumhoff began around “midnight on July 18, 
2004, [when] Lieutenant Joseph Forthman of the West Memphis, Arkansas, 
Police Department pulled over a white Honda Accord because the car had 
only one operating headlight.”166 “Donald Rickard was the driver of the Ac-
cord, and Kelly Allen was in the passenger seat.”167 “Forthman noticed an 
indentation, ‘roughly the size of a basketball,’ in the windshield of the 
car.”168 Donald Rickard appeared nervous and let Kelly Allen speak with 
Forthman, who asked Donald Rickard to step out of the car after he failed to 
produce his driver’s license.169 “Rather than comply with Forthman’s re-
quest, [Donald] Rickard” fled.170 
“Forthman gave chase and was soon joined by five other police cruis-
ers[, one] driven by Sergeant Vance Plumhoff,” the eponymous petitioner.171 
“The officers pursued [Donald] Rickard east on Interstate 40 toward Mem-
 
 161. Lewis v. Sacramento Cnty., 98 F.3d 434, 438 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d sub nom. 
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (discussing Brower and explaining that 
because it is was undisputed that defendant officer did not intend to hit the plaintiff with his 
patrol car, “[t]here was thus no Fourth Amendment violation”). 
 162. Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 163. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 164. See supra notes 147–161 and accompanying text. 
 165. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 166. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2014). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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phis, Tennessee,” and “attempted to stop [him] using ‘a rolling roadblock,’ 
but they were unsuccessful.”172 The vehicles “swerv[ed] through traffic at 
high speeds,” reaching speeds over 100 miles per hour.173 “During the chase, 
[Donald] Rickard and the officers passed more than two dozen vehicles” 
before Donald Rickard exited the interstate in Memphis, eventually collid-
ing with one of the cruisers and spinning out into another cruiser.174 
“Now in danger of being cornered, [Donald] Rickard put his car into 
reverse ‘in an attempt to escape.’”175 As he did so, two officers got out of 
their cruisers and approached Donald Rickard’s car, which made contact 
with yet another police cruiser.176 As Donald Rickard’s tires started spin-
ning, and his car was rocking back and forth, Plumhoff fired three shots into 
the car.177 Donald Rickard then reversed and maneuvered onto another 
street, forcing one officer to step to his right to avoid the vehicle.178 “As 
[Donald] Rickard continued ‘fleeing down’ that street, [two officers] fired 
[twelve] shots toward [the] car, bringing the total number of shots fired dur-
ing this incident to [fifteen.]”179 Donald “Rickard then lost control of the car 
and crashed into a building.”180 He and Kelly Allen died from a “combina-
tion of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered in the crash that [ultimately] 
ended the chase.”181 
The estates of both Kelly Allen and Donald Rickard filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging 
numerous state-law and constitutional claims.182 The defendant officers 
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district 
court denied the motion.183 The officers appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, and a merits panel affirmed the district court’s decision, holding 
that the defendant officers’ conduct violated Donald Rickard’s Fourth 
 
 172. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 179. Id. at 2018. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Estate of Allen v. City of W. Memphis, No. 05-2489, 2011 WL 197426, at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. Jan. 20, 2011), aff’d in part, 509 F. App’x 388 (6th Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Or-
der]. 
 183. Id. at *6–12. The trial court, relying on Lewis and Claybrook, held that Kelly Allen 
was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at *11. 
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Amendment rights.184 The Supreme Court granted the officers’ petition for 
writ of certiorari on November 15, 2013.185 
The Supreme Court in Plumhoff analogized its decision in Scott v. Har-
ris,186 where the Court did not analyze whether the plaintiff was seized with-
in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the defendant officer used 
his police vehicle to ram the plaintiff’s vehicle to terminate a high-speed 
chase.187 Using the seizure definition from Brower, the Court in Harris 
acknowledged the government had terminated the plaintiff’s freedom by 
means intentionally applied when the officer applied his push bumper to the 
rear of plaintiff’s vehicle, causing him to lose control of his vehicle and 
crash.188 
The Plumhoff decision, like Scott before it, did not discuss whether a 
seizure occurred.189 But in determining that the officers did not use exces-
sive force by firing at the fleeing vehicle fifteen times, the Court explained 
that “the presence of Kelly Allen in the front seat of the car . . . [does not] 
change[] the calculus.”190 At this juncture in the decision, Justice Alito high-
lighted the current circuit split over whether someone in Allen’s position 
could recover under the Fourth Amendment, but expressed no view on the 
matter.191 
Thus, the question remaining after Plumhoff is whether a passenger in 
Kelly Allen’s position can bring an excessive force claim under the Fourth 
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ini-
tially held that Kelly Allen was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and analyzed her estate’s excessive force claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment.192 After granting a motion to reconsider the estate’s 
Fourth Amendment claim193 and following the Plumhoff decision, the dis-
trict court again held that Allen’s Fourth Amendment claim “depends on 
whether Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk” and that her 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.194 Because immunity from the 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. 134 S. Ct. 635 (2013). 
 186. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 187. Id. at 381. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–22 (2014). 
 190. Id. at 2022. The Court noted that “[o]ur cases make it clear that ‘Fourth Amendment 
rights are personal rights which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.’” Id. (quoting Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). 
 191. Id. at 2022 n.4.  
 192. Summary Judgment Order, supra note 182, at *11–12. 
 193. Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration at 5–11, Estate of Allen v. City of W. 
Memphis, No. 05-2489 (W.D. Tenn. July 23, 2013). 
 194. Order Granting Second Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–13, Estate of Allen v. 
City of W. Memphis, No. 05-2489 (W.D. Tenn. March 24, 2015). 
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remaining state-law claims was unavailable to the defendant officers, both 
cases eventually settled out of court following Plumhoff.195 
III. ARGUMENT 
“Accidental seizures are . . . beyond the scope of a Fourth Amendment 
that encompasses only those situations in which the government intends to 
capture a specific individual in a precise manner.”196 The Supreme Court’s 
multiple definitions of what constitutes a seizure and the Court’s rejection of 
negligence as a basis for constitutional claims place “accidental seizures” 
beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.197 Such claims must, therefore, 
be analyzed under state law—constitutional, statutory, or tort—or the 
framework of substantive due process.198 Yet courts—notably the Sixth Cir-
cuit and, to a certain extent, the Eleventh Circuit—permit Fourth Amend-
ment claims by individuals who are not the intended target of police offic-
ers’ use of force.199 The majority of the federal circuit courts that requires 
“accidental seizure” victims to bring their claims under the Fourteenth rather 
than the Fourth Amendment evince a better reading of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions concerning seizures.200 
While declaring that the Fourth Amendment addresses the “misuse of 
power” rather than the unintentional effects of otherwise constitutional gov-
ernment conduct,201 the Brower court held “that constraint of a person does 
not reach constitutional significance if the police do not intend for the con-
straint to occur.”202 And although the Court in Graham established that “all 
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or 
not—in the course of a[] . . . ‘seizure’ . . . should be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment,”203 the Supreme Court later clarified that Graham does 
not require all constitutional claims relating to physically abusive police 
conduct to be brought under the Fourth Amendment.204 Rather, unless police 
 
 195. E-mail from Michael A. Mosley, Arkansas Municipal League, to author (March 6, 
2016, 04:31 CST) (on file with author). A decade after the incident, the plaintiffs collectively 
settled for $17,500. Id. 
 196. Bacigal, The Right of the People, supra note 48, at 146. 
 197. See discussion infra Parts III.A–B. 
 198. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 199. See discussion supra Part II.D.1. 
 200. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 201. Brower v. Cnty. Of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Byars v. United States, 
273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). 
 202. Bacigal, The Right of the People, supra note 48, at 155. 
 203. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (emphasis omitted). 
 204. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 (1997). In light of Lanier, the majority 
opinion in Graham could be read to support the proposition that no generic standard under 
any amendment—e.g., the Fourth Amendment—governs all excessive force claims. Graham, 
490 U.S. at 399–400 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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conduct triggers the protections of the Fourth Amendment, an excessive 
force claim should be analyzed under state law and substantive due process 
principles.205 In other words, the unintentional application of physical force 
by police does not satisfy the Brower definition of a seizure and does not 
give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim.206 These limits and the definitions 
of seizure provided by the Supreme Court reveal that claims like those 
brought by Kelly Allen’s estate should be decided under state law and the 
doctrine of substantive due process rather than the Fourth Amendment’s 
“reasonableness” standard. 
A. Accidental Seizures Do Not Comport with the Supreme Court’s Defini-
tion of What Constitutes a Seizure 
Excessive force claims brought by victims of accidental seizure fall 
outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment as defined by the Supreme 
Court. In Lewis and Brower, the Court foreclosed recovery under the Fourth 
Amendment “for damages that innocent bystanders incur as a result of po-
lice pursuits.”207 Under Brower, negligent or accidental conduct by police 
officers does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; specifically, a 
seizure must be willful to be actionable under the Fourth Amendment.208 
Thus, a vehicle passenger is not seized by police gunfire unless there is a 
governmental termination of the freedom of the passenger’s movement 
through means intentionally applied to the passenger.209 Because the Su-
preme Court defined “seizure” in “situations in which the use of physical 
force or the ‘show of authority’ was directed at a criminal suspect, most 
courts have applied the Fourth Amendment only to the relationship between 
the police officer and the suspect, not the officer and injured bystanders.”210 
This position, adopted by the majority of federal circuit courts, requires 
adoption of the Brower definition of seizure within the police chase context. 
One argument against adopting the Brower “requirement that a seizure 
be ‘intentional’ [is it] allows reckless shootings to evade review if one fo-
 
 205. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). The Fourth Amendment 
“is not a general prohibition of all conduct that may be deemed unreasonable, unjustified or 
outrageous.” Medeiros v. O’Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 206. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 207. Bull, supra note 117, at 1030–31. 
 208. Baskin v. City of Houston, Mississippi, 378 F. App’x 417, 418 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that “any attempt to allege excessive use of force in the course of a negligent 
seizure is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brower”). 
 209. Brendlin is not to the contrary. The Court concluded that an unintended person “‘[may 
be] the object of the detention’, so long as the detention is ‘willful’ and not merely the consequence 
of ‘an unknowing act.’” Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
 210. Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 367. 
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cuses solely on the act of shooting and not the conduct preceding the shoot-
ing.”211 Indeed, Justice Stevens lamented in Hodari D. “that a police officer 
may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment—as long as the officer misses his target.”212 But under Hodari 
D., such a show of authority could amount to a seizure if it unambiguously 
conveyed the message that the citizen was not free to leave.213 Furthermore, 
brazen misconduct of police would implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of acts undertaken “to terrorize, cause harm, or kill.”214 
Another problem is that although the language in Brower regarding po-
lice intent eliminated accidental—i.e., unintended—seizures from the Fourth 
Amendment’s ambit, “it did not establish the point at which an intended 
seizure becomes an accomplished seizure.”215 However, “Hodari D. did for 
attempted seizures what Brower had done for accidental seizures” by plac-
ing attempted seizures “beyond the coverage of the Fourth Amendment be-
cause a seizure occurs only when the government successfully controls the 
citizen, either by [physical] restraint or by obtaining his submission to a 
show of authority.”216 
Finally, “[t]he Brower allusion to the accidental effects of otherwise 
lawful conduct . . . avoids the fundamental question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment encompasses a situation in which a police officer’s volitional 
act[—]whether ultimately reasonable or unreasonable[—]results in an acci-
dental intrusion upon the suspect’s freedom of movement.”217 One commen-
tator questions whether the Brower court declined to extend the Fourth 
Amendment to accidental seizures and expand section 1983 to encompass 
mere negligence, thus avoiding further punishing the constable for well-
intentioned blunders.218 This is the position taken by the majority of circuit 
courts, and reflects the Brower majority’s rejection of accidental seizures.219 
The minority of circuits that permits Fourth Amendment recovery for 
unintentional victims of police seizure rely on a more expansive concept of 
intent to apply physical force.220 The Supreme Court seems to have left room 
for such interpretation in Harris, noting that the defendant officer’s decision 
to terminate a high-speed chase by ramming the fleeing suspect’s vehicle 
 
 211. Id. at 380 (alteration in original). 
 212. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 630 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 628. 
 214. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998). 
 215. Bacigal, A Unified Theory, supra note 45, at 921. 
 216. Id. at 922. 
 217. Bacigal, In Pursuit, supra note 35, at 92. 
 218. Id. at 95. 
 219. Id. at 96. 
 220. See Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 369 (“Some courts require an 
objective intent to stop a particular individual, and others require an objective intent to use 
means which results in a stop, whether of a known or unknown person.”). 
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amounted to a seizure.221 A dictum in Brendlin also appears to support the 
proposition that means may be intentionally applied to more than one tar-
get.222 However, permitting accidental shooting victims to bring Fourth 
Amendment claims ignores the line—drawn in Brower and traced in 
Brendlin—between “willful” detentions and the consequences of unknowing 
acts.223 Although several circuits have analyzed only whether Brendlin gives 
passengers standing to challenge automobile searches,224 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit expressly declined to extend the holding of Brendlin to cases involving 
the use of deadly force that accidentally injures hostages or innocent by-
standers.225 Doing so would go beyond the Fourth Amendment’s limits on 
seizure powers, which were intended to prevent government actors from 
arbitrarily and oppressively interfering with the privacy and personal securi-
ty of individuals.226 The Court recognized this very point in Brendlin, reject-
ing the idea that all motorists who move to the side of the road as police pull 
over another vehicle are seized.227 
Moreover, the minority position that permits “accidental seizures” is at 
odds with Brower, which imposes a minimal but purely subjective require-
ment to trigger Fourth Amendment coverage: “the acquisition of control 
over a suspect is a ‘seizure’ only if the officer intended to accomplish [the 
seizure] by the means actually used to do so.”228 At least one circuit court of 
appeals has also viewed Brendlin in this light.229 Accordingly, accidental 
shooting victims who are unintentionally struck by police gunfire do not fall 
within the Brower definition of when the application of physical force 
amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
 
 221. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). 
 222. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 261 (2007) (explaining that if the car in Brow-
er “had had another occupant, it would have made sense to hold that he too had been seized 
when the car collided with the roadblock”). 
 223. Id. at 254 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). 
 224. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 540 F. App’x 363, 364 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curi-
am); United States v. Guzman, 454 F. App’x 531, 534 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sy-
monevich, 688 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 225. Cooper v. Rutherford, 503 F. App’x 672, 675 (11th Cir. 2012). At least one federal 
district court has followed suit. Rosenbloom v. Morgan, No. 313-CV-160-RS-CJK, 2015 WL 
300428, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2015) (discussing Brendlin and explaining a “plaintiff must 
be the intended object of the act of restraint”). 
 226. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 263. 
 227. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 262. 
 228. Dix, supra note 131, at 378. 
 229. Gardner v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, for Kansas City, Mo., 641 F.3d 947, 952–53 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
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B. Negligence Does Not Give Rise to a Fourth Amendment Claim 
When “accidental seizures” amount to negligence, resulting claims are 
traditionally governed by state law and insufficient to trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.230 Although the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the Constitution does not supplant traditional tort law,231 the Court has left 
open the possibility that some constitutional provisions may be violated by 
negligent conduct.232 But while the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
standard has been compared to a negligence regime,233 the “exclusion of 
negligence from the Constitution seems unequivocal and broad.”234 Accord-
ingly, decisions across several circuits support the proposition that police 
negligence does not give rise to a Fourth Amendment excessive force 
claim.235 And, relevant to excessive force claims brought by unintended vic-
 
 230. See supra notes 228–229 and accompanying text; infra notes 231–234 and accom-
panying text. 
 231. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (“Our Constitution deals with the large 
concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law 
in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in socie-
ty.”). 
 232. Id. (“[W]e need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provi-
sions that would be violated by mere lack of care.”); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 547–48 
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The intent question cannot be given ‘a uniform answer 
across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional violations which might be the subject 
of a § 1983 action.’”), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 233. L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding 
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1534 (2011) (arguing that negligence is “the effective rule embodied 
by the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment”). But see Anne Bowen Poulin, The 
Fourth Amendment: Elusive Standards: Elusive Review, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 132 (1991) 
(“[E]ven though the [F]ourth [A]mendment speaks of unreasonable searches and seizures, it does 
not leave the courts to define what is unreasonable with the latitude of a jury in a negligence ac-
tion.”). 
 234. Conner v. Rodriguez, 891 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1234 (D.N.M. 2011). 
 235. See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846–50 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding 
plaintiff seized when he submitted to officer’s show of authority and applying Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard only to officer’s intentional action of drawing weapon 
before officer slipped on ice, accidentally shooting the plaintiff); Evans v. Hightower, 117 
F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no evidence that defendants intended their vehicle 
to strike plaintiff); Sturges v. Matthews, 53 F.3d 659, 662 (4th Cir. 1995) (approving jury 
instruction on excessive force that no violation occurred upon a finding that plaintiff’s inju-
ries resulted “from an accident or from an unknowing act”); Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 
1339 (11th Cir. 1991); Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
accident during police chase was not “means intentionally applied”); Pleasant v. Zamieski, 
895 F.2d 272, 276–77 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard 
only to officer’s intentional acts of officer unholstering and not reholstering his weapon be-
fore accidental shooting); Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7–8 (2nd Cir. 1987) (reject-
ing plaintiff’s claims based on simple negligence because the Fourth Amendment “only pro-
tects individuals against ‘unreasonable’ seizures, not seizures conducted in a ‘negligent’ 
manner”); Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The constitutional 
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tims, the Supreme Court in Brower “significantly narrowed the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment” by equating seizures with “intentional” conduct,236 
placing police negligence outside the amendment’s purview.237 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s applications of the exclusionary rule 
and qualified immunity238 reveal a fundamental tolerance for governmental 
intrusions on liberty that fall short of deliberate misconduct,239 and a com-
mon theme throughout many use-of-force cases is deference to an officer’s 
judgment.240 Although negligence once came within the Supreme Court’s 
formulation of the exclusionary rule,241 the Court in Herring v. United States 
concluded that negligence by police was insufficient to trigger the protec-
tions of the exclusionary rule, because “any marginal deterrence [of consti-
tutional violations] does not ‘pay its way.’”242 At its very core, the Fourth 
 
right to be free from unreasonable seizure has never been equated by the Court with the right 
to be free from a negligently executed stop or arrest.”). 
 236. See Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 374. 
 237. Bacigal, The Right of the People, supra note 48, at 171–72. 
 238. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 n.1 (2012) (citing United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–923 (1984)) (explaining that the Court has held “‘the same 
standard of objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing 
in Leon defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer’ who obtained or relied on an 
allegedly invalid warrant”); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); Jennifer E. Laurin, 
Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 670, 672 (2011) (citing Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)) (arguing the 
contours of the exclusionary rule announced in Herring “were not drawn primarily from 
exclusionary rule jurisprudence, but rather from the arena of constitutional tort law—
specifically, from the good faith defense, or qualified immunity”); H. Richard Uviller, Sei-
zure by Gunshot: The Riddle of the Fleeing Felon, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 705, 
708–15 (1986) (examining Garner and “its impact on the exclusionary rule in criminal prose-
cutions”). 
 239. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011) (“But when the police act 
with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, or when their con-
duct involves only simple, isolated negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, 
and exclusion cannot pay its way.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (explaining that “[a]llegations of negligence or 
innocent mistake are insufficient” to mandate an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of 
affidavits supporting warrants); Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment 
in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191, 207 (2010) (“‘Mere negligence’ would make 
many—if not most—Fourth Amendment violations inappropriate candidates for suppression.”). 
 240. Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable Seizure? The Relevance of 
an Officer’s Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
651, 658 (2004). 
 241. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984) (“The deterrent purpose of the 
exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very 
least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right.”). 
 242. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143–48 (2009) (citation omitted) (noting that 
“the abuses that gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that was pa-
tently unconstitutional.”). At least one state supreme court has rejected Herring on state law 
grounds. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 192–199 (Pa. 2014). 
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Amendment and its reasonableness standard “embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”243 High-speed 
interstate chases and encounters with apparently dangerous suspects on city 
streets are not exceptions. In light of the wide latitude afforded to police and 
the express pronouncement in Brower that the Fourth Amendment addresses 
the misuse of governmental power and not the inadvertent effects of other-
wise lawful government conduct,244 the Fourteenth Amendment becomes the 
final resort for accidental shootings victims to adjudicate their federal con-
stitutional rights. 
Finally, states have considerable autonomy in fashioning their own 
remedies for the use of deadly force by police officers.245 Although federal 
plaintiffs have had some success litigating use-of-force claims on negligence 
grounds, judicial resistance to constitutional claims premised on negligence 
“runs high.”246 The Supreme Court has recognized that states, through their 
courts and legislatures, may expand the duties of care and protection owed 
by the state’s agents, “[b]ut not ‘all common-law duties owed by govern-
ment actors were . . . constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”247 
In the same vein, the Court has repeatedly explained that the protections of 
the Constitution are not coterminous with those provided by state law.248 As 
 
 243. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
 244. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Byars v. United States, 
273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927)). 
 245. Roger K. Picker, Police Liability in High-Speed Chases: Federal Constitution or 
State Tort Law; Why the Supreme Court’s New Standard Leaves the Burden on the State and 
What This Might Mean for Maryland, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 141 (1999). Moreover, mis-
conduct may subject police officers to criminal liability. See generally John V. Jacobi, Prose-
cuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 802–15 (2000) (discussing prosecutions 
for police misconduct at the state and federal levels and proposing a more stringent federal 
criminal civil rights statute). Following the events giving rise to Plumhoff, no criminal charg-
es were filed in connection with Donald Rickard’s death; however, the State of Tennessee 
prosecuted three officers for the death of Kelly Allen. Jay Shapiro, High Speed Police Pursuit 
and The Fourth Amendment, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 7265, November 4, 2014, at 1–2. 
The charges were ultimately resolved through pretrial diversion. Id. at 2. 
 246. Michael Avery, Police Chases: More Deadly Than a Speeding Bullet?, TRIAL, De-
cember 1997, at 53. 
 247. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989); see 
also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 
6.3.4.1 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the relationship between state law and the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 248. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998) (explaining the “need 
to preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional claims, lest the Constitution be de-
moted to what we have called a font of tort law”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 
(1986); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (“Section 1983 imposes liability for vio-
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Judge Friendly famously explained in Johnson v. Glick,249 “[n]ot every push 
or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s 
chambers,” violates the Constitution.250 Since Glick, some courts adhere to 
the view that it is “not the function of a federal court to force state tort law 
into unfamiliar contours under the guise of constitutional interpretation.”251 
Increasingly, state supreme courts have recognized more expansive 
protections of individual rights under state constitutions than the protections 
arising from federal courts’ interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.252 Al-
most fifty years ago, an early commentator on state constitutional law rec-
ognized that “there are large gaps in . . . federally protected rights which will 
have to be filled by the states.”253 Justice Brennan echoed this sentiment 
eight years later, writing that “[s]tate constitutions . . . are a font of individu-
al liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”254 The benefits are many 
when constitutional protections arise at the state level: avoiding the re-
straints of federalism; the ability of the states to experiment in the area of 
individual rights; and the more efficient implementation of rights originating 
locally, as opposed to enforcing “those which emanate from Washington.”255 
Several states have rejected on independent state constitutional grounds the 
Supreme Court’s definition of a seizure.256 Thus, accidental shootings may 
give rise to claims under state constitutional law or another federal constitu-
tional provision, specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
lations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of 
tort law.”). 
 249. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 250. Id. at 1033. Glick has arguably “been the most influential decision perpetuating the 
‘shocks-the-conscience’ test for excessive force claims under [section] 1983.” Lewis M. 
Wasserman, Students’ Freedom from Excessive Force by Public School Officials: A Fourth 
or Fourteenth Amendment Right?, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 55 (2011). 
 251. Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1041, n. 9 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 252. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 792, 67 S.W.3d 582, 584 (2002) (citing 
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001)) (“[W]e do have the authority to impose greater 
restrictions on police activities in our state based upon our own state law than those the Su-
preme Court holds to be necessary based upon federal constitutional standards.”); see also 
CLANCY, supra note 246, § 1.4 (“State courts have increasingly turned to analysis of their 
own search and seizure provisions to afford broader protections to individuals than the Fourth 
Amendment offers.”). 
 253. Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renais-
sance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125, 164 (1969). 
 254. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 255. Force, supra note 253, at 163–64. 
 256. CLANCY, supra note 247, § 5.1.4.2.5 (compiling cases and noting that “Hodari D. 
may be the single most important event persuading state courts to depart from Supreme Court 
opinions in construing their own constitutions”). 
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C. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibits Egre-
gious Police Misconduct 
When police activity does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, the 
Fourteenth Amendment becomes the most textually obvious source of con-
stitutional protection from abusive government conduct.257 The Supreme 
Court so held in Lewis.258 Furthermore, the Court has historically reserved 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process for claims that in-
volve police misconduct.259 The Court has also consistently held that the 
constitutional guarantee of substantive due process prohibits governmental 
officials from violating citizens’ civil liberties,260 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment reemerged as a basis for excessive force claims following 
Brower.261 Thus, when a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth 
Amendment, does not cover a particular claim, courts should analyze al-
leged constitutional violations that arise from the use of force under the ru-
bric of substantive due process provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.262 
The shocks-the-conscience test announced in Lewis exists mainly to 
preserve the Fourteenth Amendment for grievous and blatant abuses of gov-
ernmental authority.263 The Court in Plumhoff noted that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects “accidental seizure” victims when a police officer has 
“a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”264 The 
Court has delineated the use of “unreasonable force” under the Fourth 
Amendment and a deprivation of life and liberty “without due process of 
law;”265 the Court has also expressly rejected attempts to shoehorn claims 
into express constitutional provisions rather than the general protections of 
the Due Process Clause.266 A close reading of Graham reveals that, although 
no generic standard applies to all claims of excessive force, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is available as a constitutional basis for accidental police shoot-
 
 257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 258. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1998). 
 259. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Urbonya, “Accidental” Shootings, supra note 3, at 375 (compiling cases). 
 261. Id. at 374. 
 262. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517, 539 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) 
(stating that the reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment should be used for exces-
sive force cases rather than the substantive due process standard). 
 263. Roger K. Picker, Police Liability in High-Speed Chases: Federal Constitution or 
State Tort Law; Why the Supreme Court’s New Standard Leaves the Burden on the State and 
What This Might Mean for Maryland, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 165–66 (1999). 
 264. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2022 n.4 (2014). 
 265. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 n.4 (1985). 
 266. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 70–71 (1992). 
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ing victims who are not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.267 
Therefore, when the use of force does not trigger the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment, excessive force claims are properly analyzed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.268 The latter amendment provides an avenue for 
plaintiffs like the estate of Kelly Allen to bring a constitutional claim against 
the West Memphis police officers.269 A separate question arising in such a 
case would be whether a passenger’s Fourteenth Amendment claim would 
rise or fall with the driver’s Fourth Amendment claim.270 
D. Kelly Allen’s Claim Under the Fourth Amendment 
If presented with whether Kelly Allen’s estate could sustain an exces-
sive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, the controlling Supreme 
Court precedent establishes that the estate cannot sustain such a claim. The 
estate’s claim would have been unique in the sense that it is not clear wheth-
er Kelly was a suspect, hostage, or simply an innocent bystander.271 Further 
complicating the analysis is the fact that Kelly Allen was struck by a bullet 
fragment.272 
 
 267. Graham, 490 U.S. at 393–95. 
 268. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). 
 269. The district court, initially finding that Kelly Allen was not seized within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, analyzed her excessive force claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and found no constitutional violation. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 
182, at 28–33. 
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1, 10–11 (1985). 
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Although she interacted with the officer during the initial traffic stop in 
West Memphis, Kelly Allen was not necessarily a criminal suspect.273 Nor is 
it clear that Donald Rickard took his companion as a hostage, although he 
exposed her to the dangers of a police chase and arguably left her no chance 
to seek safety as he sped along Interstate 40.274 Kelly Allen may be best 
characterized as an unsuspecting bystander who found herself an unwilling 
participant in a rapidly evolving and eventually fatal high-speed pursuit. 
This determination may or may not come to bear on the analysis of an “ac-
cidental seizure” following Plumhoff.275 
However, the bullet fragment that accidentally struck Kelly Allen is far 
different from the roadblock in Brower, which the Court explained was not 
only a significant show of authority to induce a voluntary stop, but also a 
mechanism designed to produce a stop by physical impact if voluntary com-
pliance did not occur.276 A bullet fired from a police officer’s gun becomes a 
seizure when it hits its intended target or induces the target to submit to the 
officer’s show of authority.277 Here, neither occurred, but a closer call arises 
under Brendlin. 
An aside in Brendlin reflects the Supreme Court’s sentiment that the 
definition of a seizure announced in Brower would have applied to a pas-
senger in the vehicle that collided with the police roadblock.278 This reason-
ing supports the Brendlin holding that all occupants of a vehicle are seized 
when the vehicle submits to a police officer’s show of authority (e.g., flash-
ing blue lights), thereby bringing the vehicle and its occupants within the 
officer’s physical control.279 But police encounters that end in gunfire fall 
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outside Brendlin and its adoption of the Mendenhall test—which is, ulti-
mately, an extension of the analysis announced in Hodari D.—for when an 
individual can only passively submit to a show of governmental authority.280 
Gunfire aimed at a particular suspect that strikes a third party is governed by 
Brower and does not amount to a seizure for lack of intent to terminate the 
third party’s freedom.281 Even if Brendlin were to apply, no seizure of Kelly 
Allen occurred because the officers did not show unambiguous intent to 
seize Kelly Allen and Donald Rickard continued to flee after the officers 
began firing; thus, there was no submission to the officers’ show of authori-
ty as required by Hodari D. and Brendlin.282 Furthermore, Brendlin must be 
read alongside Hodari D., which established that the Mendenhall test alone 
is an insufficient condition for a seizure.283 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s existing precedent provides that Kelly 
Allen was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and its 
reasonableness analysis is not available for victims who bring Fourth 
Amendment claims for unintentional applications of deadly force. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures—and police officers’ use of excessive force—
form a complicated doctrinal web.284 It is anything but surprising that the 
federal circuit courts of appeals differ on who may address their grievances 
under the Fourth Amendment.285 As it stands today, the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in this muddy area of constitutional law reveal that citizens who are 
the unintended victims of lethal police force are entitled to a substantive due 
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and not a cause of action 
under the Fourth Amendment.286 Claims brought by accidental shooting vic-
tims do not fall within the Supreme Court’s prevailing seizure definition, 
nor does the Fourth Amendment govern negligent police conduct.287 It is 
axiomatic that not all “intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 
‘seizures’ of persons,”288 and substantive due process as defined in Lewis 
provides the federal constitutional framework available for claims brought 
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by individuals who are accidentally shot by police. Protection also may arise 
at the state level. When a vehicle passenger like Kelly Allen is struck by 
police gunfire and files suit against the officers, such claims must be gov-
erned by substantive due process and state law. 
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